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Abstract 
European welfare states face serious financial difficulties caused by persistent high levels of 
unemployment and demographic ageing. Serious organisational problems are accompanied by 
inefficiency. Fiercer international competition and closer European integration put pressure on 
social policy in the EU member states, and creates competition between national welfare states. 
Sustainable European welfare states in general and maintainable social security systems in 
particular require fundamental reform. In this paper a plan for a common EU-wide safety-net is 
presented. The current proposal differs considerably from previous proposals involving the 
establishment of a basic income, wage subsidies, an earned income tax credit or workfare. 
Simulations show that the proposal is both effective and efficient.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The present welfare state crisis is endogenous to its own growth in the postwar period. 
Inactivity is subsidised (Delsen, Van Gestel and Van Vugt, 2000). For millions of 
European citizens social assistance has become a relentless if well-intentioned trap. In 
some countries equally well-intentioned disability pensions schemes have become a 
hidden receptacle for people who, because of age or unemployability, are squeezed out 
of the labour market. From a macroeconomic point of view a huge amount of human 
capital remains unused while the financial burden and the work-pressure of the active 
part of the population have increased. Most of the risks the social security systems 
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cover, depend on demographic factors. Naturally, this applies to child allowance and 
old-age provisions, which cover the demographic risks. However, disability, illness, 
medical expenses and unemployment are also age related, meaning that these risks 
increase with age. Moreover, there are serious organisational problems. European social 
security has developed piece-meal in the course of many decades. European social 
security systems have been subject to equally haphazard and ad hoc adaptations, 
improvements and cutbacks. As a result their legal structure, organisation and 
administration have become complex, inefficient and therefore expensive. Deficiencies 
in the political process have pushed welfare state spending beyond the optimum level 
where marginal benefits are equal to the marginal costs of public funds. Political 
coordination failures due to incrementalism in stead of simultaneous political decisions 
on all budget items, resulting from prohibitive transaction costs, can partly explain this 
overexpansion and overshooting of the welfare state (Lindbeck, 1994). A reduction in 
the social burden requires a reform of social security systems. Also the high and 
persistent levels of unemployment, partly caused by the social security systems, and the 
demographic ageing force to reconsider the European welfare state. Moreover, 
European welfare states have failed to develop an efficient instrument of income 
insurance on behalf of low-skilled workers (Drèze, 2002). As a result of the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) the need for social protection is growing, while on the 
other hand EMU reduces the quality of the social environment and the resources (tax 
base) to finance this protection. EMU accelerates the present shift towards share-holder 
capitalism characterised by short-termism, and intensifies the growth of insecure 
temporary and marginal jobs. EMU also implies that the nation states suffer a 
considerable loss of macroeconomic policy sovereignty, without the European Union 
actually gaining anything of equivalence. This undermines the existing barriers against 
the “social dumping syndrome”. Social dumping has a major impact on national 
welfare states. Simultaneously, welfare shopping may be reinforced by increased 
transparency and the enlargement of the European Union (EU), that narrows the 
financial base. The ensuing race to the bottom may erode the welfare state, or at least 
result in the underprovision of insurance, and too low supply of public goods (Delsen, 
2002a). The central question that will be answered in this paper is: Are European 
welfare states sustainable? To answer this question the implications of closer European 
integration for these welfare states will be established, as well as the role policy at the 
EU level can and should play in welfare state reform. 
 This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 the welfare state is defined and 
four models of European welfare states are characterised. In Section 3 the theoretical 
relationship between positive and negative integration on the one hand and positive and 
negative policy competition on the other hand is established. The causes of policy 
competition, and its implications for European welfare systems are outlined. In the 
Sections 4, 5, and 6 respectively, the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence 
concerning social dumping, social tourism, and the race to the bottom in relation to the 
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European welfare states are established. It is argued that there are reasons to harmonise 
European welfare systems. In Section 7 a plan for a common EU-wide safety-net is 
outlined, that builds on the existing trends in national welfare state policy and is based 
on the European Councils’ recommendations 92/441 and 92/442 related to European 
welfare states. In Section 8 simulations of the plan are presented. The concluding 
Section 9 summarises the main results of the paper. 
 
 
2. Four models of national welfare states 
 
A welfare state is a country with a democratic constitution, where production is largely 
governed by the price mechanism and where the government tries to guarantee its 
citizens an acceptable standard of living through a combination of consultation, 
regulation and activation of the budget mechanism. A welfare state is engaged in 
"social spending", and in "social investment". From an operational point of view, one 
can speak of a welfare state when the expenses towards social security, health care, 
education, and housing total a certain minimum percentage of the gross domestic 
product (GDP). The size of a welfare state may also be calculated by the share of 
income redistributed. The system of social care and security constitutes the backbone of 
the welfare state. Old-age pensions are the largest component of total expenditure on 
social protection in all EU countries. Health care is the second largest component in all 
EU countries. (For Ireland the rank order is reverse.) Together the two components 
constitute over half of all social expenditure (EC, 2002). 
 Industrialisation is an important determinant in the development of the welfare 
state. The continental European system can be considered a reaction to massive 
industrialisation and a protection against serious professional risks. However, apart 
from technological determinism also economic prosperity and ideology play an 
important part in the development of the national welfare states in Europe. Each welfare 
state is the product of a very specific national history and culture. In the European 
Union four models of welfare states can be distinguished: The Scandinavian model, the 
Anglo-Saxon model, the continental model, and the southern European model (See 
Table 1). The continental European system consists of employee insurances and health 
care for which both the premium and the wage replacing benefit are linked to the 
employees’ earned wages. Social security in continental European countries still largely 
reflects the Bismarck model, featuring insurance and employment based benefits and 
provisions mainly aiming at maintaining employees’ incomes. The Anglo-Saxon 
system is a national insurance against loss of income for all citizens, consisting of tax-
financed basic benefits and health services. Social security in Anglo-Saxon countries in 
many ways reflects the Beveridge model, featuring relatively large social assistance of 
the last resort schemes. As for the other models, the Scandinavian model combined 
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elements of both the Bismarck and the Beveridge model, and added a stress on 
reintegration in the labour market. High levels of social protection expenditure and 
universal welfare provisions based on the citizenship principle characterise the 
Scandinavian model. Welfare states in the southern European countries appear to have 
followed a course of its own. Only southern European social security systems expressly 
aim to combat poverty. 
Table 1: Welfare state models in the European Union 
  
Scandinavian 
model 
Anglo-Saxon 
model 
Continental 
model 
Southern 
European model 
1 Type Aimed at full 
employment; 
welfare state in 
the first place 
“employer”, in the 
last place payer of 
benefits 
Aimed at 
economic growth; 
welfare state in the 
last place payer of 
benefits, and strict 
focus on work on 
labour market 
Aimed at 
economic growth; 
welfare state in the 
first place payer of 
benefits, in the last 
place employer 
Economically 
aimed at catching 
up with northern 
states; welfare state 
is only a semi-
institutionalised 
promise 
2 Right to Work Transfer of 
income 
Social security Work and social 
security (only 
partly 
implemented) 
3 Primary 
responsibility 
The state The state Labour market Family and church 
4 Solidarity based 
on 
Society Individual (no 
solidarity) 
Economic sector Family 
5 Redistributive 
effect 
Large Average Restricted Restricted 
6 Support 
(reintegration 
etc.) 
Extensive Restricted Average Restricted 
7 Level of benefit Average/high Average/high Differentiated Low 
8 Scope All residents All residents Employees Aimed at the poor 
9 Aim Guarantee social 
protection 
Guarantee social 
protection 
Maintaining 
income 
Combat poverty 
10 Funding Taxes Taxes Contributions Contributions and 
other sources 
(church etc.) 
11 Financial 
independence of 
labour market 
High Low Average High 
12 Administration Trade unions/ 
central 
Central/state Private Private 
Source: Delsen, Van Gestel and Pennings, 2000. 
  
 5 
 As to the policy dimension, since the early 1990s reintegration of beneficiaries 
appears to have become a more important policy objective for all European 
governments – at any rate at the ideological level. The objectives of all models of social 
security can now be found in a combination of providing social protection and of 
encouraging persons to re-enter work. In that context, benefit levels in Scandinavian 
and Anglo-Saxon countries, though still relatively high, have decreased and converged 
with benefit levels in continental countries. Also in order to solve budget problems 
and/or to satisfy the EMU criteria, in all models there have been restrictions in benefit 
levels, and a tightening of rules regarding eligibility for social security benefits. 
Incentives to search for work are given to those who are able to work. In several 
countries a right to work, although rather weak, exists for the young and for the long-
term unemployed. In all models fairly large employment creation schemes have been 
organised, to help claimants and beneficiaries into work. However, while support of 
reintegration has become more important in the Anglo-Saxon, the continental and the 
southern European models, in the Scandinavian model it has decreased considerably in 
the process of convergence. Although work tests like in the Scandinavian model have 
become more prevalent in all EU social protection schemes, the social security systems 
in many EU countries still aim at exclusion rather than at transition towards 
employment. The various national social security systems in Europe still are largely 
designed to provide income rather than to reintegrate workers. Large quantities of 
money are spent on the condition that the beneficiaries do not work or do not earn. The 
replacement of labour income with public transfers is the dominant form of assistance 
(See Van Vugt and Peet, 2000; Corsetti et al., 2002).  
 The slowdown in social expenditure growth in the second half of the 1990s is 
related to rising employment and efforts of EU member states to consolidate public 
finances in the light of the Maastricht Treaty. However, real social expenditure per 
capita continued to rise. In the second half of the 1990s there has been a tendency in the 
EU member states to limit the contributions and taxes on employed labour, and to 
replace them by general taxation or earmarked taxes. In addition special reduction of 
employers’ social contributions for taking on long-term unemployed and exemption of 
low earnings from social contributions have been introduced. In the first half of the 
1990s the decline was concentrated on employers’ contributions, in the second half of 
the 1990s on employees’ contributions (See EC, 2000; 2002; Joumard, 2002; Bertola, 
Boeri and Nicolletti, 2001).  
 Table 1 also indicates that the respective roles and responsibilities of the state, 
of voluntary social organisations, and of households and individuals are still very 
different in the four welfare state models. As to the organisational dimension of change, 
in the 1990s two apparently conflicting tendencies can be identified (Delsen, Van 
Gestel and Van Vugt, 2000). On the one hand, primary responsibility for social security 
seems to have shifted to the state in those countries where the state did not already had 
that responsibility. On the other hand, a tendency can be seen in all models to increase 
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the responsibility of the employers and employees for themselves – generally, and also 
in organised solidarity and social security funding. Taken together, both developments 
may point in the direction of a new balance in the responsibility for social security all 
over Europe. There seems to be a creeping convergence towards a mixture of 
Beveridgean universal flat-rate low coverage and a Bismarckian supplementary system, 
mainly based on labour market participation. 
The differences in social protection systems between the EU member countries 
are also reflected in social expenditure. In general, gross public expenditure on social 
protection is much higher in the North than in the South of the EU. Social security is 
often considered a luxury good: Income elasticity of the demand for social security 
exceeds one. The inter-countries differences are explained by the level of GDP per 
capita, i.e. the ability to pay (See Scharpf, 1997; Rayp and Meeus, 2002). For the total 
set of industrialised countries 1994 data indicate practically no correlation between 
wealth (GDP per capita) and social spending. This correlation becomes stronger for the 
15 EU member countries (Scharpf, 1997). Data for 1999 show that in the EU the 
relationship between GDP per head and expenditure on social protection is not strong 
(EC, 2002). Apart from GDP per head also the age structure, the level of 
unemployment, and the share of private social services determine social spending. 
Taking account of differences in price levels between countries - measuring spending in 
terms of purchasing power standards (PPS) - four groups of countries can be considered 
(EC, 2002): 
1. Around 3,500 PPS per capita: Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal; 
2. Around 5,500 to 5,900 PPS: Italy, Finland and the United Kingdom; 
3. Between 6,400 and 6,700 PPS: Belgium, Germany, France and Austria; 
4. Above 6,900 PPS: Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden. 
Also these data confirm higher public social expenditure in the North relative to the 
South, and lower expenditure in the Anglo-Saxon countries relative to the continental 
European countries. Gross figures overstate cross-country differences. Comparison of 
public expenditure levels is distorted as in some countries benefits are net of taxes, 
while in others they are gross and taxed. There is less variation between EU member 
states if taxes and social charges levied on benefits are taken into account. A net 
estimation diminishes public expenditures considerably in the high spending countries 
(Adema et al., 1996; EC, 2002). In 1999 the net expenditure on social protection to 
GDP ratio in Sweden (29%) is reduced below the level in Germany (30%). In Denmark 
(25%), the Netherlands (23%) and Finland (23%) these ratios are reduced below the 
level of the United Kingdom (27%). The Belgian level equals the United Kingdom 
level. In addition to net public expenditure, also net private social expenditure have to 
be taken into account in international comparison of social expenditure. In 1993, the 
total public and private net expenditure on social protection as a percentage of GDP in 
the Netherlands (24.9%) was equal to that of the United Kingdom (24.7%), and lower 
than that of Denmark (26.6%), Germany (28.2%) and Sweden (32.8%) (Adema et al., 
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1996). The fact that the national total net expenditure on social security are more or less 
equal (See also OECD, 1999), shows that preferences in regard to social protection are 
quite homogenous. This means that privatisation of social security does not lead to a 
lower total expenditure, but to substitution effects.  
 
 
3. Negative versus positive policy competition 
 
The European economic union has mainly been the result of negative integration. 
Negative integration consists of an obligation which restricts the freedom of member 
states and does not involve the transfer of power to a supranational level. It requires no 
institutional development. Negative integration concerns the removal of national 
regulations, customs barriers, quotas and technical specifications, which can interfere 
with the free movement of capital, goods, services and labour. Scharpf (1997) refers to 
negative integration as the "market-making" processes. Positive integration occurs 
when in addition to national policies a number of common policies are developed on 
planning, controls, the fixing of priorities and consequences for re-distribution. Positive 
integration concerns the building up of welfare state arrangements - of the "in-kind" as 
well as the "in-cash" type - to compensate for the effects of negative integration. These 
positive integration policies involve the creation of regional institutions that limit the 
autonomy of national economic institutions. Public market-rule-making and policy-
making powers are transferred from the national level to the union level. Scharpf (1997) 
refers to positive integration as the inner "market correcting" processes.2 Measure of 
positive integration require explicit agreement of national government in the Council of 
Ministers. Hence, positive measures can only be achieved through coordinated 
decisions by the 15 member states according to their respective constitutions and 
political structures. In Europe conflicts are likely to arise taking into account the 
differences in the levels of economic development and wealth (productivity and GDP 
per capita), institutional differences (differences in cost of adjustment), and ideological 
differences among governments. Policy blockage of positive integration is quite likely. 
National problem-solving capacities are reduced by constraints of more intensive 
economic competition and the legal force of negative integration, while European 
action is constrained and often blocked by conflicts of interest under decision rules 
imposing very high levels of consensus. The non-existence of supranational welfare 
policies makes it more difficult to implement national welfare policies (Scharpf, 1997). 
Moreover, closer European integration may result in free-riding by national 
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governments by shifting their structural inefficiencies onto other countries. As a result 
structural reform of the European welfare state systems is difficult to achieve. 
 In Europe less space is being allocated to a “demand-side policy”, which is 
becoming increasingly ineffective and restricted. The variability of exchange rates is an 
important balancing mechanism between economies which are at different stages of 
development and which have different economic and institutional structures. However, 
EMU implies that exchange rates as an automatic equaliser are no longer available. 
EMU also implies that the present 12 member states have lost their monetary 
sovereignty. Estimates from the European Commission (Buti and Sapir, 1998) show 
that if countries stick to the medium term objective of keeping their budget in balance, 
the Stability and Growth Pact offers substantial room for automatic stabilisers to 
function. De Grauwe (1998) argues that the pact restricts the budgetary policy. 
Government budgets are robbed of part of their automatic stabilisers (De Grauwe, 
1998). Cutbacks and tax increases to balance the government budget aggravating the 
present downturn seem to confirm this. The most important impact of EMU on the 
welfare state is through its effect on national budgets and spending policy. As a result of 
negative integration and selective positive integration and institutional deepening in the 
EU policy competition via the supply side of the economy is becoming increasingly 
important. This implies that structural policy and institutions are increasingly becoming 
the national selling points of governments to attain competitive advantages.3 Unlike 
financial and monetary policy, social policy in Europe is mainly national policy. 
Authority is not substantially transferred to European decision-making. Considerable 
differences in the welfare states between the European Union member states are a cause 
for policy competition. Policy competition has two dimensions: Namely a positive and 
negative. Positive and negative policy competition are at odds with each other. Negative 
policy competition between governments who wish to attract or retain foreign 
investment and producing firms and to protect domestic jobs involves competitive 
deregulation and “flexibilisation”, tax cuts, and privatisation. Positive policy 
competition involves constructive measures aimed at improving the investment climate, 
such as investment in the material and immaterial infrastructure. Social cohesion and 
stability are conducive to the investment climate. Social spending is not just a cost 
factor: The income distribution effect of social security may have a positive effect on 
the accumulation of human capital, and economic growth through a greater degree of 
innovation. Businessmen simply consider national welfare state policies as one of many 
factors of production. In the Treaty of Rome differences in social protection were 
considered to reflect basically the income and productivity differentials between the 
member states. Social convergence had to follow from income convergence that was 
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expected to result from the integration of the market (Rayp and Meeusen, 2002). 
Market integration and policy competition are supposed to generate economic growth 
and keep nations fit. A "benign neglect" of the downward harmonisation of social 
protection and working condition in Europe is the result. Since a large part of labour 
costs in Europe comprises taxes and premiums, there is a direct relationship between 
the macroeconomic competitive position and social protection. According to Scharpf 
(1997) it is remarkable that negative integration in the EU includes elaborate rules that 
prevent distortion in competition arising from subsidies, preferential public 
procurement and other forms of "affirmative action" favouring national producers, but 
non against the practices of competition deregulation and competitive tax reductions. 
The next three sections respectively deal with social dumping, welfare shopping, and 
the race to the bottom hypothesis. 
 
  
4. Social dumping 
 
Social dumping refers to unfair competition between national systems caused by 
differential wage costs, working conditions and social costs. Mosley (1990) 
distinguishes three forms of dumping: Replacement of products, movement of capital 
and low wage policy, and policies to create a secondary labour market to obtain a 
competitive advantage. Sinn (2001) refers to wage dumping covering wages, working 
conditions and wage related fringe benefits that make up employers’ labour costs, and 
welfare dumping concerning the redistribution of resources between different types of 
individuals, such as tax-financed transfers to the poor. The latter will suffer from tax 
competition. Countries are tempted to reduce claims of those groups - the young, the 
sick, the unemployed and the old - that most depend on public services and welfare 
transfers. A reduction in the social standards in the North is a form of social dumping. 
However, also a deliberate neglect by less-developed countries of the legislation for 
good social standards in terms of social fringe benefits, protection against injuries, 
pension schemes, codetermination rights and the like is a form of social dumping. They 
may stick to low social standards and do not care about low wages, because they know 
that competitive advantages for the domestic industries result (Sinn, 2001). However, 
reliance on low pay for jobs or competitive survival may imply falling into a low-
productivity trap. Wages not only represent a cost factor, they are also a source for 
effective demand, and provide employers and employees with positive incentives to 
innovate and to increase productivity. 
Increased private capital mobility induces fiscal policy competition. Adverse 
spill-over effects on other countries may result in a tendency towards inefficient low tax 
rates and an associated too low supply of public goods, and hence the erosion of welfare 
states. Financial capital mobility will lead to social dumping if the financing of the 
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social insurance system affects the return on capital. Countries have an incentive to 
lower these taxes in order to attract capital. However, this theory does not take into 
account the dynamic effects of capital accumulation. Low tax rates could stimulate 
growth and due to the transmission by the international capital market stimulate also 
economic growth in other countries (Lejour, 1995). Also lower trade barriers, and a 
better exploitation of economies of scale could exert a downward effect on prices, 
which stimulates production and employment. This broadens the tax base for social 
insurance contributions, and could have a positive effect on the benefit levels. It may 
also be argued that employers can not move their fixed physical capital easily to other 
countries. Real capital is less mobile than labour (Lejour, 1995; Sinn, 2001).  
Whether tax competition is harmful depends on the relative size of the 
economic and political distortions. Harmonisation may be called for when economic 
allocative distortions are large and political decision-making distortions are small. In 
the reverse case tax competition may be welcomed to discipline ineffective 
governments (Eijffinger and De Haan, 2000). Also the country size matters. Small 
European states can actually gain from tax competition and may be reluctant to support 
cooperation: The tax base effect may swamp the tax rate effect (Genschel and Dehejia, 
1999). It is the threat that matters: The differences in national systems act as an 
incentive for companies to practice social dumping. Jobs may be or threatened to be 
relocated to regions where labour is cheapest and least protected. Moreover, EMU 
intensifies competition and hence the growth of marginal jobs - flexible jobs (on-call 
employees, agency workers and fixed term contracts) and small part-time jobs - and is 
likely to result in more earnings below the minimum subsistence level. The threat of 
working poor and dependency is real. Moreover, the expected growth of flexible work 
will in the case of job loss result in an increase in the number of supplementary benefits 
up till the minimum level. The austerity of the social security system also contributes to 
this growth of insecure jobs. Workers may fall into unemployment and poverty traps 
(Delsen, 1999). Sinn (2001) argues that the income redistribution between the rich and 
the poor will indeed be eroded in systems competition, while refuting the artificial 
reduction in wages and fringe benefits in the transition process by less-developed small 
open economies: "The temporary lag of wages and social standards has nothing to do 
with social dumping; it is the result of the efficient working of the Invisible Hand in 
system competition". Welfare dumping is not wage dumping.  
 Countries with low social standards, and hence lower labour costs, have a 
comparative advantage. This comparative advantage gets more weight in EMU. The 
introduction of the euro makes social dumping more effective to improve the country’s 
competitive position. For under EMU, the adjustments in the exchange rates of the 
participating countries and by differing rates of inflation, to compensate for the effects 
of social dumping is no longer available. Moreover, competition between national 
welfare state models will increase, for the euro increases transparency, and national 
labour costs, taxes, levies and other terms and conditions are now more readily 
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comparable (See Delsen, 2002a). So, social dumping is likely to get worse under EMU. 
Moreover, new information and communication technologies allows to exploit existing 
differences at low costs. 
 
Table 2: Labour costs in manufacturing in European countries, 1999, (euros per 
working hour) 
   Labour costs per hour  Of which Of which 
    in euros   direct costs indirect costs 
West Germany   25.5   55%  45% 
Denmark   22.9   80%  20%  
Belgium    22.0   51%  49% 
Sweden    20.8   58%  42% 
Finland    20.6   56%  44% 
Netherlands   20.3   55%  45% 
Austria    20.0   52%  48% 
Luxembourg   19.7   66%  34% 
France    17.3   53%  47% 
United Kingdom   16.8   71%  29% 
East Germany   15.9   60%  40% 
Italy    15.5   51%  49% 
Ireland    13.6   71%  29% 
Spain    13.3   55%  45% 
Greece    8.3   58%  42% 
Portugal    6.1   55%  45% 
Source: Calculated from Sinn (2001). 
 
Gross hourly wage costs differ substantially among the European countries. 
Table 2 gives an overview of the hourly labour costs in manufacturing among European 
countries. In 1999 for EU-15 the average hourly wage costs were about 18 euros, 
varying from 6 euros in Portugal to 25 euros in West Germany. A further distinction is 
made between direct and indirect costs. Direct costs refer to gross wages per hour, i.e. 
the official annual pay divided by the number of working hours. The gross wages 
include the employees’ social security contributions, overtime supplements, shift 
compensation, regularly paid premia, pay for vacation and national holidays, year-end 
bonuses and similar items. Indirect costs consist of employers’ social security 
contributions, sick pay schemes, and other social expenses such as those for sports 
facilities, canteens medical services and vocational training. Indirect wage costs are part 
of the costs for social standards. These indirect costs are important determinants of the 
competitiveness of a single country. Table 2 shows that these indirect costs are 
substantial; 40% and over of the total wage costs for most EU countries, ranging from 
49% of the total wage costs in Belgium and Italy to 20% in Denmark. Also the Anglo-
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Saxon countries have relatively low indirect costs.4 Sinn (2001) concludes from this 
that there is a systematic relationship between direct wage costs and indirect wage 
costs: Countries with a high direct wage also tend to have a high indirect wage. 
 
Table 3: Employers’ and employees’ contributions for social protection (% of 
labour costs, compensation of employees) in European countries, 1999 
   Employers’   Employees’              Total 
   Contribution   contribution 
Ireland   8    5   13 
Denmark  5    10   15 
Portugal   13    7   20 
United Kingdom  12    11   23 
Luxembourg  10    9   19 
Sweden   20    5   25 
Spain   20    3   23 
Finland   21    5   26 
EU-15   19    9   28 
Austria   18    12   30 
Germany  19    11   30 
Italy   25    5   30 
France   25    9   34 
Netherlands  17    17   34 
Belgium   25    10   35 
Greece   27    12   39 
Source: Calculated from EC (2002). 
 
When we look at social contributions in particular a different picture emerges 
(See Table 3). The total level of contributions varies considerably between countries, 
ranging from 13% and 15% in Ireland and Denmark to 35% and 39% of the labour 
costs in Belgium and Greece. There is no systematic relationship with wages. Italy and 
Greece are confronted with high contribution levels. These are countries with relatively 
low levels of labour cost per hour. Also Spain and to a lesser extent Portugal have high 
contribution rates relative to their labour cost per hour (See Table 2). There also are 
considerable inter country differences in the level of contributions paid by employees 
and employers. The latter may cause difficulties for countries to catch up and is a cause 
for system competition. In most countries employers’ contribution are considerably 
higher than employees’ contribution. Exceptions being the Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
the United Kingdom were employers and employees contribute equally, and Denmark, 
where employees’ contributions are higher. 
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 The low percentages are probably related to the fact that in the Scandinavian model and in the 
Anglo-Saxon model, benefits are mainly financed from general taxation. In the other two models 
benefits are financed from payroll contributions (See Table 1). 
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There will be a tendency to increase wages in the economically weaker 
countries in the monetary union to the levels of those in the countries with stronger 
economies. Employers and employees in the richer countries will support this because 
they benefit from it. Trade unions and employees in the poorer countries will use the 
higher level of wages and social protection as the benchmark for their own wage 
claims. This convergence, i.e. upward harmonisation in social protection and wages 
may result in costs increasing more than productivity gains. Moreover, the desire for 
harmonisation will bring increased demands for transfer payments to the weaker 
countries. This will reward and stimulate inappropriate behaviour by trade unions 
(moral hazard). In the richer countries the taxes have to be raised to finance the 
increasing inter-country stabilisation transfer payments, reducing incentives, weakening 
growth and, finally, undermining the ability to make transfer payments to the poorer 
countries. Indeed, social expenditure as a percentage of GDP shows some upward 
convergence, despite the weak social protection programmes at the community level 
(See Alber and Standing, 2000; Delsen, Van Gestel and Van Vugt, 2000; EC, 1998; 
Rayp and Meeuw, 2002). Boeri (2002) on the other hand shows that for the OECD 
countries in the period 1980-1990 there is a low convergence rate (less than 0.2% per 
year) and is barely statistically significant. The same applies to the EU-15 countries, 
plus Iceland, Norway and Switzerland in the 1990-1999 period. He also concludes that 
there has not been an additional effect of European integration or EMU on the 
convergence of the size of the welfare state (Boeri, 2002). In the second half of the 
1990s and in 2000 and 2001 productivity growth in the low-wage countries Portugal, 
Greece and notably Ireland was clearly above the EU average. Also nominal wage 
increases were well above the EU average in these countries. This indicates an upward 
convergence of productivity and wage levels in Euroland. However, as a result also the 
annual growth of unit labour costs in Greece, Ireland, Portugal as well as in Spain is 
above average, indicating a deterioration of competitiveness, which can result in a 
slower economic growth and job losses (Delsen, 2002a). The latter will burden the 
social security system and the social security ratio because the basis for financing is 
narrowed down (denominator effect), but also because the number of allowance 
recipients goes up (numerator effect). The reported convergence in social expenditure 
as well as the relatively high contribution rates in the South are mainly linked to the 
increased unemployment levels. Also the German unification is an example in this 
respect. Western employers and union representatives helped convince the government 
to impose west German work standards and the west German social security system on 
the east Germans (Sinn, 2001). In the case of Germany the transfer payments to the 
poorer east were massive. In the west Germany taxes had to be raised. Also the increase 
in contributions to the EC structural and agricultural funds by about 10 billion euros 
linked to the planned enlargement fits in here. These developments put pressure on the 
welfare states in both the South and the North, and a consequently call for structural 
reform of the European welfare state systems. 
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Rayp and Meeuws (2002) conclude from their simulations in a two-region - 
North-South - context that policy coordination would imply somewhat higher levels of 
social protection and welfare, and would enhance social convergence between the 
regions. There would appear to be no real threat of any downward adjustment in social 
protection within the EMU. The explanation for this is the large degree of homogeneity 
of the preferences related to social protection (See also Section 2). Strulik (2002) 
considers two countries each populated by workers and capitalists and equipped with a 
government that collects taxes to finance productive expenditure and income 
redistribution. Both groups in each country benefit from an abolition of the welfare state 
in the long run. Starting from autarky, free trade and capital mobility are introduced in a 
neoclassical growth model. Fiscal policy competition leads to a reduction of tax rates, a 
relative increase of productive expenditure by the government, and hence a reduction in 
the budget share of redistribution measures. The welfare state is largely reduced 
although not completely abolished. Lejour (1995) concludes that increasing integration 
exerts a downward pressure on the social insurance budget. In the EU social insurance 
policies are used as a competitive instrument. However, it is not clear whether these 
policies are more frequently used as an instrument for policy competition. The 
fulfilment of the EMU-criteria was a policy goal of social security reform in Belgium, 
Germany, Greece, Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Also the reduction of the 
costs of the social security system, of the state budget deficits, and the labour cost 
reduction were a cause for social security reform in the EU over the past years. It 
included a shift from universal and social insurance to selective means-tested social 
protection and a trend towards “residual” welfare states, i.e. the Anglo-Saxon model 
(See Alber and Standing, 2000; Delsen, 2002a; Delsen, Van Gestel and Van Vugt, 
2000). This points towards negative policy competition and social dumping. European 
minimum standards of working conditions and social protection are necessary to 
counteract the incentive towards social dumping in EMU, and help to eliminate social 
inequalities across member states. 
 
 
5. Welfare shopping 
 
Within EMU, people could be attracted to emigrate by the prospect of either higher 
benefits or higher wages in other member countries. The euro makes it possible to 
directly compare the levels of social security benefits and contribution rates in different 
countries. This increase in transparency between national social protection systems 
might make social tourism easier and more attractive, and may be reinforced by the 
enlargement of EU. Social tourism – increased flows of labour to the richer regions – 
may have a major impact on social security in the EU. Related to this welfare shopping 
refers to migration from less generous to more generous welfare states. Free movement 
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of people makes it increasingly difficult to maintain relatively high protection 
standards. Citizens from member countries with low levels of social security benefits 
would decide to make use of their rights under European Community law to settle in 
other member countries with more generous welfare payments. Adverse selection 
would be the result: Countries with relatively high protection (benefit) levels would 
attract high-risk individuals, resulting in increasing costs to the social security system. 
High benefit levels imply high tax and premium rates, and the latter would induce 
people with low risks to leave their area or country. As a result, the basis to finance 
social security would become narrower. One may expect that in Europe low-risk 
workers are much more mobile than high-risk workers. Countries may fear immigration 
of subsidised low-skilled and emigration of taxed high-skilled. If each country acts 
independently to these migration externalities, i.e. takes the migration flow into 
account, but treats the benefit levels of the other countries as given, this will result in 
inefficiency, i.e. the underprovision of insurance (Drèze, 2002). 
 It is unlikely that social tourism will significantly increase under EMU, because 
access to benefit payments is still tightly circumscribed, the rights of EU citizens are 
still ineffective and restricted, and migration is not yet a socially-acceptable option for 
the greater part of the EU population and its government. To be more specific, free 
movement of people in the EU is limited to employed people, with the exception of 
family members. Citizens from EU member states that are not economically active are 
not free to settle in a member state. Recipients of unemployment benefits are only 
allowed to settle in another EU country to look for a job for less than three months, 
without loss of social security rights. The unemployment benefit is paid in local 
currency by the home country. This implies there is no incentive for unemployed 
people in a low benefit/low wage EU member state to look for a job in an expensive 
high benefit/high wage EU country. Temporary inverted social tourism from high 
benefit/high wage countries to less expensive low benefit/low wage countries is more 
likely. Inactive people without an unemployment benefit or without income are only 
allowed to settle in another EU member state when financial guaranties are given by a 
third party. Unlike in the United States, the vast majority of EU citizens are reluctant to 
leave their country in search for better living conditions. Differences in language and 
culture are the most important barriers limiting mobility. Labour migration affecting EU 
citizens is, therefore, not a significant phenomenon and is currently showing no signs of 
increasing. Nor is any significant increase in mobility within the EU expected for the 
future, with the exception of executives and specialists (Van den Broeck, 1996; 
Vandamme, 2000).  
 In theory low mobility indicates little divergence between regions. However, in 
the European Union there still are large and growing regional disparities. Rates of 
unemployment vary much markedly between regions in the EU than between countries 
(EC, 2001). Moreover, the regional and cohesion policies of the European Commission, 
which have strong political support, are expressly designed to avoid people having to 
 16 
migrate to find work and to enable them to stay in their home region. Increasingly, the 
policy emphasis has been to reduce regional problems through structural programmes, 
rather than to encourage migration (EC, 1997). Large-scale intra-European migration is 
perceived as socially disruptive. According to Obstfeld and Peri (1998) EMU is likely 
to put in place incentives to remain at home. However, the recently approved extension 
of the EU towards eastern Europe, as well as a relaxation of the regulation of migration 
without work, will put pressure on the various social security systems. At present, 
several EU member states are adapting their migration policies to cope with specific 
deficits in labour market supply. With a very few exceptions internal EU migration 
decreased slightly in the 1990s, while international extra-EU migration recently 
increased during the 1990s: The level of net migration – the difference between inflows 
and outflows of migrants - in the EU is increasing (EC, 2001). There is some evidence 
of welfare shopping. Adoption of minimum standard, a common EU-wide safety-net, 
adjusted to reflect cross-country and cross-regional cost-of-living differentials, can 
avoid enlargement related migration over Europe, and prevent welfare shopping (Boeri, 
2002; Bertolila, Boeri and Nicolletti, 2001). 
 
 
6. Race to the bottom 
 
If an individual demands a high level of public care and schooling of his 
children, an extensive public social insurance, very good public transport facilities, etc. 
he is willing to pay a high tax or premium for such arrangements. EU citizens directly 
compare the public services they demanded and the level of taxation. This will generate 
in- and outflow of mobile labour and of the most mobile production factor capital. Not 
necessarily towards the country with the lowest tax rate. This does not imply a race to 
the bottom, but a race to the most efficient use of tax receipts. However, in a strongly 
competitive market with limited national macroeconomic policy autonomy individual 
countries are tempted to reduce their wage costs and level of social protection and 
taxes, and hence the welfare state in order to attract foreign investment and to make 
home-located firms more competitive. With no legal barriers to migration in the 
integrated EU labour market the forces of "fiscal competition" are at work. EU labour 
market integration entails migration externalities, resulting in underprovision of 
insurance and a race to the bottom (Drèze, 2002). Intensified by EMU, social dumping 
may ceteris paribus result in social convergence towards an ever lower level, and thus 
in a general deterioration of social protection within the EU. Other countries will be put 
under pressure by such competition to make corresponding cuts. A prisoner’s dilemma 
occurs: Either a country improves its own competitive position if other countries refrain 
from doing so, or the country prevents a worsening of its own competitive position if 
similar measures are adopted abroad. Unemployment is exported. This "beggar-thy-
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neighbour" policy results in the building down of the social model, because countries 
that resist will be confronted with an increasing competitive partner. None of the 
countries will actually bear the fruits of their restrictive social policy measures. There 
will be only losers. Competitive deregulation and tax cuts will for the competing 
countries result in less than desired wage levels and a lower than preferred level of 
social protection, i.e. undershooting of the welfare state (Agell, 1999). Strulik (2002) 
shows by a two-country model that if both countries coordinate their fiscal policy the 
reduction of taxes and income transfers is less pronounced. In a calibrated version this 
result is shown by calculating the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria solutions for two 
countries: The average Europe G-4 country (Germany, Italy, France and the United 
Kingdom) and the United States. Lower taxes and a higher share of productive 
expenditure by the governments cause a decrease of the welfare state. Globalisation 
does not induce the European to adopt the relatively low American share of welfare 
spending, but it does induce both countries to reduce the size of its welfare state. 
Although the United States remains the country with the relative smaller welfare state, 
the reform in Europe is much more pronounced, indicating a downward convergence.  
 Based on trends in social spending as a percentage of GDP the empirical 
support of social dumping and a race to the bottom threatening European social welfare 
states is weak (Boeri, 2002; De Grauwe and Polan, 2002; Rayp and Meeuw, 2002). 
Between 1985 and 1997 social security contributions have increased and does not 
support the race-to-the-bottom scenario. No large scale race-to-the-bottom tensions are 
apparent in recent European experience. National social policies display remarkable 
stability, stemming from well-rooted welfare state traditions. Related to the replacement 
rate of social assistance to the unemployed between 1985 and 1995 there has been a 
“race to the top”. Cuts in social spending are not uniform but selective. Moreover 
existing provisions became more generous over time (See Bertola, Boeri and Nicolletti, 
2001). Alber and Standing (2000) on the other hand conclude that compatible with the 
notion of race to the bottom there has been a trend to lower social spending relative to a 
given level of wealth. 
During the second half of the 1980s and the 1990s unbridled tax competition 
between EU member states caused the average tax rates on the mobile factor of 
production, notable capital, to fall from 45% to 35%; the average tax rate on labour 
increased from 35% to 42%, having negative effects on the level of employment and 
growth in Europe, and hence on the levels of tax revenues (Eijffinger and De Haan, 
2000). Welfare states are resilient. However, fiscal competition for capital income and 
for labour taxes on high-skill wages is already there, and will become more pressing 
after enlargement The underprovision of income protection in an integrated labour 
market is an issue that cannot be ignored in the EU (Drèze, 2002). Joumard (2002) 
points out that although in the EU there is no clear evidence of a race to the bottom at 
corporate income tax level, a recent trend in capital income taxation and preferential tax 
treatment to non-residents by many EU countries may signal such a pressure to lower 
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taxes on highly mobile factors is at play. Also intra-cross-border shopping contributes 
to the tax base erosion. Here coordination of tax policy at the European level could 
moderate the tax base erosion pressure. A common tax rate is necessary to prevent free 
capital movements and tax arbitrage from creating a race to the bottom. Cooperation 
and coordination related to welfare state policies between countries is a solution to the 
prisoner’s dilemma. However, significant differences in the size and the composition of 
public spending imply different financing needs, which may in turn warrant specific 
differences in tax systems. Diverging interests and linked to this the highly likely policy 
blockage of positive integration imply that the required unanimity for any decision on 
tax policy is difficult to reach (See Section 3). 
 Wage costs are not the only issue in international competition. In companies’ 
decision-making concerning the location of their investments such factors as a well-
organised national infrastructure, high education levels, a supportive banking system, 
state services and, last but not least, industrial peace are also taken into consideration. 
The quality of the public goods is of importance. The efficiency and cost-effectiveness 
of the public goods provision in the EU member states may be decisive for the location 
of companies (Eijffinger and De Haan, 2000). The welfare state plays a positive role in 
this respect. Apart from a social function, a welfare state also has an explicit economic 
function in capitalist economies. The welfare state is an investment and not just a cost 
factor. The welfare state, i.e. equality and efficiency are complements. The welfare state 
supplies with services that might not automatically be provided for in a satisfactory way 
by either the family or the market, such as education and health care. Compulsory 
insurance is a solution to market failures, i.e. may be motivated on efficiency grounds. 
Compulsory insurance mitigates the problem of adverse selection, exploits returns to 
scale, and it helps to solve the free-rider problem (Lindbeck, 1994). There is a positive 
relationship between social spending as a percentage of GDP and competitiveness.5 
This implies that the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis is incorrect (De Grauwe and Polan, 
2002). Strong national competitiveness is preceded by a period of high social spending. 
The latter implies that the causality goes from social spending towards competitiveness, 
and not reverse. High social security spending creates an environment with less social 
conflicts, and improves incentives to take risks and are a proxy for the willingness of 
societies to invest in the quality of human capital (See Delsen, 2002b; De Grauwe and 
Polan, 2002). In this context, relevant research has been conducted by Rodrik (1997) in 
an attempt to answer the question of why small, open economies have a larger 
government sector. There is complementarity between governments and markets: The 
provision of social insurance by governments protects against the effects of external 
                                                          
5
 Competitiveness has many dimensions: "The degree to which a country can, under free and fair 
market conditions, produce goods and services which meet the test of international markets, 
while simultaneously maintaining and expanding the real incomes of its people over the long 
term." 
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economic risks, which include exchange rate instability and the product concentrations 
in exports. In developing countries, that do not have a system of social security, this 
role is performed by government consumption. So the government can actually act to 
absorb economic shocks and to reduce insecurity risk. The government makes growth 
of the markets possible. This is at odds with the traditional ideas behind the neoclassical 
economic theory, in which governments are detrimental to markets and their growth. 
Therefore, the discussion about reducing the welfare state should not be about the size 
of the welfare state so much as about its structure and its function in capitalist 
economies. Starting from this notion, in the next section a plan for an EU level welfare 
policy is presented that contributes to the sustainability of European welfare states. 
 
 
7. The plan 
 
Explicit coordination of social policy at the EU level does not go beyond declaration of 
principle. Related to the European welfare states the 1992 Recommendations no. 
92/441 and no. 92/442 of the Council of the European Communities to the member 
states are relevant.6 These recommendations on minimum benefits and convergence of 
benefits mainly recommended: 
- That employed persons be provided with a level of social security, sufficient to 
maintain their standard of living in the event of the materialisation of social risks; 
- That all residents be provided with a minimum level of social assistance and 
protection, sufficient to cover their essential needs. 
Generally, according to the 1992 Council’s recommendations, social policy (and social 
security) should combat poverty and social exclusion, and should aim at integrating, 
economically and socially, those people who rely on social security provisions (Delsen, 
Van Gestel and Pennings, 2000). It is for member states to determine how their social 
protection schemes should be framed and the arrangements for financing and organising 
them. In 2000 the Lisbon European Council decided to intensify policy cooperation in 
crucial areas of social protection: The open method of coordination aims to encourage 
and facilitate to identify and exchange good practice and innovative approaches of 
common interest related to social inclusion, health care and pensions. 
 Social policy at a European level demands positive integration (See Section 3). 
Economic convergence is a necessary condition for social convergence. From previous 
sections it can be concluded that a European minimum standard is an answer to social 
                                                          
6
 ‘Council Recommendation of 24 June 1992 on common criteria concerning sufficient resources 
and social assistance in social protection systems’ (92/441/EEC, published in: Official Journal of 
the European Communities, L 245, 26.8.92, p. 46-48), and ‘Council Recommendation of 27 July 
1992 on the convergence of social protection objectives and policies’ (92/442/EEC, published in: 
Official Journal of the European Communities, L 245, 26.8.92, p. 49-52). 
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dumping, a race to the bottom, as well as welfare shopping. In case of considerable 
economic differences between member states, harmonisation of social protection at a 
high level will imply a relative increase in costs and a deterioration of the 
competitiveness of the weaker countries, and a reduction of the ability of lower-income 
countries in the EU to make full use of their comparative cost advantages, and thereby 
to catch up with more advanced economies. Within EMU minimum standards and 
social harmonisation clash with productivity differences between EU countries. A 
uniform European social dimension may result in economic divergence; a widening of 
the regional income gap, while the aim of EMU is to promote convergence of economic 
performance (Delsen, 2002a). In an integrated economy, uniform minimum absolute 
welfare levels are likely to have the most negative employment effects in the relative 
poor countries and regions. Hence, minimum standards should be specified on a relative 
basis (Bertolila, Boeri and Nicolletti, 2001). Moreover, these standards will help the 
established, incumbent workers (insiders) at the expense of the outsiders (the long-term 
unemployed, the school leavers, and the temporary workers). Hence, social minimum 
standards may hurt precisely the people whom it was meant to help. 
 Are there options for reorganising European welfare states that could reduce 
mass unemployment and maintain aspirations of social justice, even under the 
conditions of an internationalised economy? Full employment and a high activity rate 
are conditions sine qua non for a sustainable welfare state in general and a maintainable 
social security system in particular. Vandenbroucke (1998) refers to “egalitarian 
employment policies” as the future of the welfare state. Employment is the core issue 
for the future of the welfare state, both for fundamental reasons of social cohesion and 
individual self-esteem and for reasons of economic sustainability. The question, then, 
arises, as to which policy mix or institutional arrangements will allow for more individ-
ual choice and will make the best use of the available labour resources both in the short 
and long term, and that produce both efficiency and equality, i.e. full employment and a 
fair distribution of jobs and earnings. The target of full employment depends upon 
assumptions or goals regarding labour force participation rates, the length of the 
workweek and the frictional unemployment. Whether these conditions have been met 
depends on the economic situation and on the welfare state system itself. The conditions 
under which the welfare state delivers its benefits are crucial. If the system fails to 
adequately encourage those dependant on benefits to resume work, the safety net will 
turn into a hammock. There is a moral hazard. In the European Union social security, 
health care, education and old age pension schemes still are largely framed on the basis 
of the traditional family and the close link of its single (male) earner with regular 
employment. By offering all breadwinners the opportunity to support their families, full 
employment ensured that mass poverty was largely eliminated (See Van Vugt and Peet, 
2000). The search for independence has lead to greater number of single-person 
households and resulted in a diversity of employment patterns. A new full employment 
concept, based on the complementarity of equality and efficiency (See Section 6), is 
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needed; a concept that fits the desire to improve the labour utilisation rates and that 
contributes to, not hampers, the flexibility of the labour market. According to the 
European Advisory Group at CESifo the welfare state should not replace labour 
income, but supplement it when it is inadequate. This implies a new definition of 
poverty: A person who does not work (welfare state replaces labour income) is replaced 
by someone who is working to his physical and mental capacity and is nevertheless 
unable to earn a sufficient income (welfare state supplements labour income). This 
group advocates an earned income tax credit system as practised in the United States 
(Corsetti et al., 2002). As pointed out by Drèze (2002) tax credits accrue after a 
substantial delay after the income has been earned and the credits only operate on the 
supply side. Moreover, tax credits must be accompanied by reductions of gross wages, 
of unemployment benefits, if low-productive workers are to become employable. 
The core of my proposal is a new concept of full employment consisting of the 
introduction at the EU level of the legal right to a basic amount of work, the right to at 
least a part-time job for all people in the workforce, combined with the stipulated right 
to a (partial) basic income guaranteed by the government. Hence, the public sector acts 
as the employer of last resort. Acceptance of part-time work is obligatory. Unjustified 
unwillingness to work will be punished by a withdrawal of the tax and premium free 
basic income amount. In this way, the current proposal differs considerably from 
previous proposals involving the establishment of a basic income or workfare in the 
form of individualised social assistance benefits with a job guarantee and an obligation 
to carry out paid work. The advantages of both systems are combined. The right to a 
basic amount of work and the obligation to work part-time – the carrot and the stick – 
increase the feasibility of a partial basic income. A stipulated partial basic income and a 
basic amount of work are two sides of the same medal: Both are complementary. From 
the point of view of European integration, the scenario will not in itself prevent social 
dumping practices between European countries but it will establish a floor under the 
national security provisions beneath which they will not, and can not, drop. The EU 
wide safety net may not prevent a general lowering of social security standards but it 
will prevent the undershooting of the welfare state and the race to the bottom. It also 
contributes to the sustainability of national welfare states,. 
 Four arguments are generally mentioned for the introduction of a basic income: 
Redistribution of employment, levelling of incomes, simplification of the social security 
system and flexibilisation of the labour market (Delsen 1997). A basic income gives 
employees greater control over working hours and entails a definite right to income 
independence. It also gives individual employees a certain bargaining power. A basic 
income enables a significant number of requisite new jobs to be created at lower levels 
for a salary below subsistence level while maintaining the minimal social standard. A 
basic income encourages risk-taking and innovation by individuals. It also implies an 
incentive for employment-intensive activities and entrepreneurship by encouraging the 
setting up of small businesses. It encourages part-time employment, freelance 
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employment and on-the-job training since the entire income no longer depends on the 
number of working hours. This is especially relevant to individuals with a low income. 
The social protection of the growing number of atypical employees in the EU improves 
considerably. The unemployed are always financially rewarded if they seek paid work. 
A basic income can act as a social safety net, providing protection against social 
exclusion. Due to the absence of a means test, a basic income actually helps the low and 
unskilled and the long-term unemployed to escape the poverty and unemployment trap. 
This is because it provides an incentive to find a job to supplement this basic income. 
The productivity and pension traps are also eliminated. Segmentation is therefore 
avoided. This is an important reason for politics to embrace the basic income. 
Moreover, it makes training and parental leave more attractive. Another advantage of 
the basic income is that the income risk associated with changing jobs decreases. This 
improves employment mobility and economic dynamics increase. Dynamic efficiency 
increases as well. Flexibility in wage costs also increases. It enables employers to adapt 
employee numbers as well as wages to changing market circumstances since there is 
less resistance among employees than when their income guarantee would be 
threatened. Reaching market clearing wages improves the allocative efficiency and 
leads to full employment and greater economic growth. The current pensionable age is 
meaningless: There is no longer a difference between 65+ and 65-. Drèze (2002) 
considers wage subsidies an efficient instrument to generate employment and to provide 
for income protection for low-skilled workers. He proposes an EU-level scheme of 
matching grants for low-skilled workers, whereby a share of national wage subsidies 
would be financed by the EU under suitable funding, i.e. levies from member states. 
Avoiding the moral hazard and free-riding accompanying his proposal may result in 
prohibitive high transaction costs. The introduction of a basic income can replace 
specific measures such as work experience projects, wage cost subsidies and working 
while retaining a benefit. The basic income can be "paid out" in cash, or as a reduction 
in taxable income or in the form of a tax credit. Tax and premium free cash payments, 
for instance on a monthly basis, are to be preferred; they can be used instantly, and are 
relatively easy to implement and to operate. Distortion of budgets or competition should 
not be feared. After all, the employed will also receive this basic income. Also the 
environment may profit from a basic income. Once the well-being of the neediest is 
divorced from the question of economic growth, and with it the moral justification of 
economic expansion, society can begin to concentrate on questions of sustainability. 
The following two options are available for financing the basic income: Abolishing part 
of government subsidies, abolishing the social security system, increasing direct and/or 
indirect fees and introducing a levy on business capital. Employment will be stimulated 
if added value is taxed instead of employment. Figures issued by the Social and 
Cultural Planning Office of the Netherlands (Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau – SCP) 
in 1993 (See Table 4) indicate that a large majority (65%) of Dutch people oppose the 
basic income. 
 23 
Table 4: Judgement of several social security systems in the Netherlands, 1993 
(percentages) 
      Basic income  Workfare 
Proponents    19   59 
Opponents    65   29 
No preference, do not know  15   12 
Total      100   100 
Source: Koopmans et al., 1997, p. 132. 
 
The level of the basic income must be pegged with delicacy: High enough to 
provide a decent living and real social security for those who have to depend upon it, 
but not so high as to deaden all ambition to earn more. Whether the scenario will indeed 
result in a flexibilisation of the labour market largely depends on the level of the basic 
income. If it is pegged too low, no positive effects will be achieved and social problems 
will increase. On the other hand, if it is pegged too high it will result in a stiffening of 
the labour market because for many people the incentive to work will prove too weak. 
Even if the basic income is fixed with discernment, it may still act as a break on labour 
mobility. Particularly low income earners (for whom the basic income represents a 
large percentage of their total income) may feel little incentive to search for new jobs 
which will improve their income only marginally. 
The introduction of a basic income would mean that policymakers should 
acknowledge that it is no longer possible to offer the entire labour force a paid (full-
time) job. It also means abolishment of the obligation to look for employment and the 
end of the right to work. In my opinion, this right to work – a component of the United 
Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights – should be upheld, no matter what. 
The government should guarantee a basic amount of work, in other words a part-time 
job for everyone in the labour force. Unemployment is defined in relation to this 
guaranteed amount of part-time work. The basic income is not subject to personal 
income and/or wealth. Here, the obligation to carry out a minimum amount of paid 
work is explicitly chosen. Part-time employment – part day, month and/or year – will 
become the new norm. The government guarantees a part-time job, which in 
combination with the basic income amounts to the subsistence level for an individual. 
Those unwilling to accept a part-time job in the private or public sector forego their 
right to the partial basic income. A supplement amounting to 100% of the subsistence 
level for single people is applicable to people who cannot work (elderly and disabled 
people). Other people will receive less, for example a partial basic income of 50 – 60% 
of the social subsistence level. They will have to earn their own income or receive 
financial support from other family members. This can be realised by accepting a part-
time job. Family values are encouraged. There should be an explicit equalisation of 
regular paid work and unpaid socially useful activities. Rearing young children, taking 
care of elderly or ill relatives, or performing voluntary community services could be 
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considered real jobs which provide an income. In this way a sound basis may be created 
for solidarity of care, for the extension and improvement of primary social care which 
so far has always depended on moral obligations and unpaid charity. The plan thus 
offers a real perspective on realising solidarity as to income, work and care – which is 
more than the current welfare states can do. 
Providing an individual with a basic amount of work – at least part-time – is 
advantageous to employees, companies and society as a whole. The individual has an 
opportunity to participate socially and economically. Social exclusion is prevented and 
the right to work is maintained. Financing the basic income is made simpler. 
International research has shown that part-time employment leads to higher 
participation among men and women, has a positive effect on the degree to which the 
production factor labour is used and has a significantly positive effect on productivity 
(Delsen, 1995). Fewer financial sources are required for people that are excluded. The 
burden of taxation and labour costs will decrease, which will have a positive effect on 
employment. 
If benefits are (too) generous and/or too easily accessible, they will have a 
“magnetic” effect. The right to social security should be accompanied by the obligation 
to work. Unemployed and disabled individuals who receive benefits and who can carry 
out work adapted to their situation are used to satisfy the unfulfillable needs of society. 
Individuals who refuse work offered to them are not entitled to claim benefit. Workfare 
appears to be an important way to deploy large groups of people at the bottom of the 
labour market in the short term (Koopmans et al. 1997: 132). The poverty trap, the 
unemployment trap and social exclusion will be avoided. The concealed unemployment 
reserve in the early retirement schemes, the disability insurance and the unemployment 
insurance can be activated. Workfare has not convinced the social partners. Employers 
are wary of the extension of the collective sector and competitive distortion. Unions 
point towards increasing competition on the labour market, which is exerting pressure 
on conditions of employment. On the other hand, a considerable group is and will 
remain dependent on benefits without workfare, resulting in substantial costs. Workfare 
is clearly supported by 59% of the Dutch population (See Table 4). Workfare was 
defined as the unemployed and disabled being obliged to carry out work that is 
beneficial to society, and are paid the minimum wage. Workfare fits in the policy trend 
present in all national welfare states in the EU (See Section 3). 
 
 
8. Simulations 
 
Simulations of the proposal have been carried out by the new Applied General 
Equilibrium (AGE) model of the Dutch CPB National Bureau for Economic Policy 
Analysis. The AGE model is the stripped down version of MIMIC, the applied general 
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equilibrium model of CPB. MIMIC is the abbreviation of MIcro Macro model to 
analyse the Institutional Context (See Gelauff and Graafland, 1994). The main 
simplifications of the MIMIC-model concern the exogenous labour supply, no 
(physical) capital, no schooling decision, and no division by sector. The stripped down 
version of MIMIC allows researchers to keep the results tractable and to focus on the 
crucial mechanisms that play a role in the impact of active labour market policies 
(ALMP) (See Jongen, Van Gameren and Graafland, 2000). The AGE model features 
equilibrium unemployment, i.e. at any point of time part of the workers is searching for 
a job, and part of the jobs is searching for a worker. Even in the absence of costly 
search by firms and workers the labour market will be characterised by equilibrium 
unemployment as wages are determined by unions and employers’ federations in a right 
to management bargaining structure. Unions maximise their utility by demanding above 
market clearing wage levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The model - an overview
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The core of the AGE-model is the so-called “matching process”. The 
“matching process” concerns the number of vacancies, the number of job seekers and 
their search effort, and the acceptance rates of firms and workers (See Figure 1). In the 
labour market firms decide on the profit maximising level of employment (and the 
associated optimal number of vacancies), and they decide on which workers to accept. 
Some productivity realisations will be unprofitable to the firm due to the presence of 
minimum wage legislation. In this respect the acceptance rate of firms refers to the 
share of contracts with workers that is profitable to the firm. Workers choose the time 
they devote to job search (the search intensity) and which jobs to accept (the acceptance 
rate of workers). Some wage offers fall short of their reservation wage. Wages and 
productivity, combined with search costs for vacancies, feed back into the optimal 
employment decision by firms.7 A distinction is made between workers in low-
productivity unemployment (stock of individuals on welfare) that are obliged to search 
for a job and workers in high-productivity unemployment (stock of individuals on 
unemployment benefits). The first concerns individuals that have lost part of their skills. 
They differ in their search and acceptance behaviour. Individuals may regain their lost 
skills in regular employment or in training jobs at minimum wage level supplied by the 
government. The volume of these relief jobs and training jobs is limited. The treatment 
effect (positive effect on search effort + increased attractiveness for firms) may 
dominate the lock-in effects. As a result search costs for firms fall. Outside regular 
employment, low-productivity individuals can participate in relief jobs provided and 
paid by the government. Compensation equals minimum wage. It is assumed that 
individuals do not regain their lost skills in relief jobs. Production by relief jobs does 
only cover 25% their compensation. Participants in training jobs are not productive. As 
a result of the higher compensation for participants in relief jobs it is optimal to reduce 
their search effort for locating private sector vacancies, and they become more selective 
towards job offers from the private sector. Search effort also suffers from the fact that 
participants devote valuable leisure time to working (“lock-in effect”). Search costs for 
firms rise, and the relatively high compensation level increases wage pressure. As a 
result relief jobs crowd out private sector employment. The relative shares of 
individuals in regular employment and in the various states outside regular employment 
determine the wage outcome via the fall-back position of workers in wage bargain. The 
model is scale independent: The unemployment rate and all other shares do not depend 
on labour supply. Labour supply determines the size of the market. The government 
transfers unemployment benefits to the unemployed. Combined with subsidies to the 
private sector, these transfers determine government outlays. To keep a balanced budget 
the government levies taxes on all workers, both employed and unemployed.  
                                                          
7
 The AGE-model is calibrated on data for the Dutch labor market in 1993. The flow model is 
calibrated for three levels of education: high-skilled, low-skilled and unskilled. 
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The results of the simulation concern a combination of the following measures 
(Graafland and Jongen, 2000): 
1. A 25% reduction in social assistance benefits for recipients who are, in 
principle, capable of working; 
2. Pay cut in job-creation posts in the public sector (relief jobs) from the 
minimum wage to the “old” subsistence level. Working hours in such jobs also 
reduced from full-time to part-time (average 16 hours a week); 
3. A tax credit of 25% of the subsistence level; 
4. A major increase in the number of job-creation posts available in the public 
sector for those entitled to social assistance who are required to seek 
employment; 
5. Reduction in the gross minimum wage, without affecting the guaranteed 
minimum income, so that the net income at the minimum level inclusive of the 
tax credit is equal to the “old” net minimum wage; 
6. Compensatory taxes, with the government varying the average tax base in order 
to maintain a balanced budget. 
Measures 1-3 increase the gap between income from regular work and income on social 
security assistance and in relief jobs. This will encourage those entitled to social 
security and those in relief jobs to actively seek (regular) employment. The remainder 
of those entitled to social security assistance will be given the opportunity to take a 
relief job in the public sector (a 13-hour so-called “Melkert” job (providing job-
experience for the long-term unemployed)) (measure 4). This measure once again limits 
the difference in income and prevents social exclusion. The gross minimum wage may 
be cut as a result of the reduction in contributions (measure 5). Employers will be 
encouraged to take on job seekers more quickly. The measures will be funded from 
compensatory taxation (measure 6). 
The simulated measures differs on a number of point from my original plan: 
- The social assistance benefit for people who are capable of working are replaced by 
a basis income of 50% of the "old" social assistance benefit. In the simulations the 
reduction is only 25%. This implies that also the tax credit equals 25% of the social 
assistance level in stead of 50%, and the reduction of the minimum wage is 25% of 
the social assistance level in stead of 50%; 
- In the simulations only the social assistance benefit is lowered for people who are 
able to accept a job. In my plan also the unemployment benefit is reduced; 
- The availability of relief jobs is limited, and only low productive job seekers are 
considers for these jobs. 
As a result of these differences and the far reaching assumptions related to training, 
skills and productivity in the AGE model the simulations underestimate the effects of 
the proposal. 
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Table 5: Simulation-results of the proposed welfare state reform 
 
Percentage changes 
 
Absolute changes 
 
 
 
 
Prices 
Labour cost (1) 
-unskilled 
-low-skilled 
-high-skilled 
Labour productivity 
Production price 
Consumption price 
 
 
0.88  
-4.16  
-0.47  
0.02  
-0.46  
-0.65  
-0.49  
 
 
 
 
Ratio’s 
Unemployment rate  
 -unskilled 
 -low-skilled 
 -high-skilled 
 incl. additional jobs (4) 
 -unskilled 
 -low-skilled 
 -high-skilled 
 
 
-1.63  
-6.06  
-1.69  
-0.81  
 -1.17  
 -6.99  
 -1.13  
-0.12  
 
Volumes 
Production (2) 
Employment (total) (3) 
-unskilled 
-low-skilled 
-high-skilled 
Employment (firms) 
-unskilled 
-low-skilled 
-high-skilled 
 
Net real income 
-minimum wage 
-unskilled 
-low-skilled 
-high-skilled 
-additional jobs 
-welfare benefits 
 
 
 
0.98  
1.74 
6.81  
1.82  
0.85  
1.44  
8.31  
1.30  
0.15  
 
 
0.03  
9.47  
2.64  
-0.45  
-34.20  
-22.90  
 
Taxes 
Average rate 
-unskilled 
-low-skilled 
-high-skilled 
 
Government 
expenditures (5) 
Wage bill 
Search costs 
Unemployment insurance 
Welfare benefits 
Total 
 
Government receipts (5) 
Taxes 
 
 
 
-0.40  
-8.13  
-1.46  
0.51  
 
 
0.21  
0.19  
0.57  
-1.81  
-0.85  
 
 
-0.85  
 
  
  
 
(1) Gross labour cost per unit of labour, excluding search costs. 
(2) Production in the private sector. 
(3) Employment including additional jobs (in persons) 
(4) The stock of unemployment plus the stock of additional jobs divided by the labour force. 
(5) In billions of guilders. 
 
The results of the simulations are presented in Table 5. The impact of the plan on 
some key macroeconomic variables and government expenditure are presented. The 
equilibrium stemming from measures of my plan (simulations) are compared with the 
 29 
initial equilibrium (base projection), i.e. the induced changes. The simulations indicate 
that unemployment will fall substantially and production will increase considerably. 
Also the inflation rate drops. The unskilled and low skilled workers in particular will 
benefit from the plan both in terms of job growth and in their purchasing power. Private 
sector employment of unskilled workers increases by over 8%. Their unemployment 
rate drops by 6 percentage-points. The net real income of the unskilled improves by 
more than 9%. The simulations also show that the proposal is budgetary neutral. In fact 
the average tax burden will fall. The proposal turns out to be in its effects a kind of 
“Robin Hood” type of income and tax policy: The lower end of the labour market 
benefits considerably more than the upper end of the labour market.  
 
 
9. Conclusions 
 
Social policy at a European level demands positive integration. Social policy at a 
European level has not (yet) been given shape since national governments still have to 
transfer substantial powers to the European decision-making structure. Almost all 
European social security systems are beset by serious financial difficulties caused by 
persistently high levels of unemployment (although these levels vary considerably 
between various countries), and by adverse demographic developments (in most Euro-
pean countries the median age of the population is rising rapidly). Moreover, there are 
serious organisational problems caused by political coordination failures. As a result of 
EMU and the internationalisation of the economies the need for social protection is 
growing, while on the other hand these developments reduce the quality of the social 
environment and the resources to finance this protection. The fears of social tourism, 
social dumping, and the race to the bottom are theoretically and empirically founded. 
Undershooting of the national welfare state is the result, that can only be avoided by 
policy coordination at EU level and a certain amount of convergence towards some 
commonly defined goals. European minimum standards of social protection are 
necessary to counteract the undershooting. Full employment and a high activity rate are 
conditions sine qua non for the survival of the welfare state in general and a tenable 
social security system in particular. The social security systems in many EU countries, 
however, aim at exclusion rather than at transition towards employment. Apart from the 
aim, the structural characteristics of the social security system are important for its 
effectiveness. 
In this paper a new concept of full employment is proposed consisting of the 
introduction of the legal right to a basic amount of work, the right to at least a part-time 
job for adults, combined with the stipulated right to a (partial) basic income guaranteed 
by the government. In this way, the current proposal differs considerably from previous 
proposals involving the establishment of a basic income, an earned income tax credit, 
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subsidised jobs, or workfare in the form of individualised social assistance benefits with 
a job guarantee and an obligation to carry out paid work. Simulation results show that 
the common EU-wide safety-net presented in this paper is both effective and efficient. 
It improves the position of those groups that are permanently excluded from paid work 
due to the current social security system. The resulting “Robin Hood” type of income 
and tax policy is budget neutral. It creates substantial additional economic and 
employment growth. The unemployment rate drop considerably and production 
increases substantially. It improves the labour utilisation rates and it contributes to the 
flexibility of the labour market. Notably the employment position and the purchasing 
power of the unskilled and the low skilled improve. It stimulates flexibility in 
companies and in the labour market. However, from a policy point of view, it is even 
more important that the right to part-time work in combination with the right to a basic 
income increases employment and that social and economic exclusion is neutralised. 
The plan offers a real perspective on realising solidarity as to income, work and care, 
which is more than the current welfare states can do. In other words, the proposed plan 
can be considered a form of active labour market policy and activating social security 
designed to improve the position of individuals who have been excluded from paid 
work due to the current social security system, the power of insiders at decentralised 
level and current employment policy.  
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